“As they reflected on this matter, numerous southerners and historians came to the conclusion that overwhelming numbers-and-resources were not the cause of northern victory after all. History offered many examples of a society winning a war against greater odds than the Confederacy faced. … In the Civil War the Confederacy waged a strategically defensive war to protect its territory from conquest and preserve its armies from annihilation. To ‘win’ that kind of war, Confederate armies did not have to invade and conquer the North; they needed only to hold out long enough to force the North to the conclusion that the price of conquering the South and annihilating its armies was too high, as Britain had concluded in 1781 and as the United States concluded with respect to Vietnam in 1972. Most southerners thought in 1861 that their resources were more than sufficient to win on these terms. Most outside observers agreed. The military analyst for the Times of London wrote that ‘no war of independence ever terminated unsucessfully except where the disparity of force was far greater than it is in this case.’ … Even after losing the war, many southerners continued to insist that this reasoning remained sound.”
— Why the Confederacy Lost, 1992